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Foreword 
Concern about global environmental change has stimulated interest in the 
comprehensive analysis of waste streams and effluents from industrial activ-
ities. This comprehensive approach has been termed industrial "ecology" 
or industrial "metabolism". There a.re many valuable studies that give in-
sights into the flows of hazardous substances like heavy meta.ls or energy 
and greenhouse gas emissions from current industrial activities . A deeper 
understanding of industrial metabolism requires also information on how in-
dustrial structures have evolved historically and how they might change in 
the future. 
The paper by Arnulf Gri.ibler provides a much needed holistic account of 
the long-term history of industrialization. The paper also identifies patterns 
in the energy and carbon intensity of industrial activities that give reasons to 
be cautiously optimistic: the goal of higher productivity also translates into 
long-term tendencies of dematerialization and decarbonization of industrial 
activities . Historically, these improvements have, however, not been fast 
enough to offset the impact of vastly increased levels of industrial production. 
Looking a.t production a.lone, however, may not be sufficient to steer the 
industrial metabolism onto more environmentally compatible development 
paths. Historically, productivity growth has led to higher incomes and a 
reduction in working time. The paper concludes that the biggest challenge 
ahead for industry is to extend the boundaries of industrial activities: pro-
viding consumers not only with products, but with environmentally friendly 
integrated solutions for satisfying particular service demands. 
Nebojsa Nakicenovic 
Project Leader 
Environmentally Compatible Energy Strategies 
Ill 
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Abstract 
Industrialization is described as a historical succession of periods of pervasive 
adoption of clusters of technological and organizational innovations. Combined 
they have enabled vastly rising industrial output, productivity, and incomes, as well 
as reductions in the amount of time worked. The resource and environmental inten-
siveness of different industrialization paths is illustrated with quantitative data on 
energy consumption and carbon emissions. It is concluded that industry in principle 
moves in the right direction of dematerialization and decarhonization; however, to 
date not fast enough to compensate for increasing output volumes. Continued struc-
tural change from industry to services and from work to pleasure will require a 
redefinition of the scope of industrial activities from artifacts to integrated solutions 
to satisfy consumer service demands in an environmentally compatible manner. 
Introduction 
Industrialization is a process of structural change. Sources of productivity and out-
put growth as well as of employment move away from agriculture toward indus-
trial activities, manufacturing in particular (Figures 1 and 2). Rising productivity 
and output in industry have been main drivers for economic growth and increased 
national and per capita incomes, which in tum provide an ever enlarging market 
for industrial products. 
Like any pervasive process of economic or social change, industrialization is dri-
ven by the diffusion of many individual (but interrelated) innovations. These are 
not only technical, but also organizational and institutional, thus also transforming 
the social fabric. In fact, the term "industrial society" has come to describe a partic-
ular type of economic and social organization, from science and industrial manage-
ment to the fine arts. An industrial society is based pervasively on the economics of 
standardization and specialization of human activities to produce, not only ever 
more, but, paradoxically, an ever larger variety of final products. 
Industry is an important part of human activities and a powerful agent of global 
change. It accounts for about 20% of employment and 40% of value added, final 
energy consumption, and carbon emissions (Table I). However, the relative 
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Figure 1. Industrialization as a process of structural change. Value generation and employment (cf. 
Figure 2 opposite) shift away from agriculture to industrial activities, manufacturing in particular. 
Source: Kuznets, 1958. 
weight of industry varies widely in time and space primarily as a function of the 
degree of industrialization (or postindustrialization) and the overall level of eco-
nomic development. 
Since the middle of the 18th century, global industrial output and productivity 
have risen unimaginably. Based on updated estimates of Bairoch (1982), global 
industrial output has risen by about a factor of 100 since around 17 50. Over the 
last hundred years, industry has grown by a factor of 40, or at an annual growth 
rate of about 3.5%. Per capita industrial production increased over the same period 
by a factor of about 11 , or at a rate of 2.3% per year. This suggests that rising per 
capita activity levels were a more powerful agent of change than was human popu-
lation growth. The growth in industrial labor productivity has been even more 
spectacular than output growth . Again the data are uncertain, but recent quantita-
tive evidence does not change the impressive account of industrial productivity 
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Figure 2. Industrialization as a process of change in occupational structure: (a) percentage of work 
force employed in agriculture vs. (b) percentage of workforce in industry. Note that industry now 
performs many activities previously residing in agriculture (from Nakicenovic et al., 1990). 
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Table I: Basic industrial activity data, 1990 
Tons of 
Seven Major Commodities 1 Final Energy Tons of 
People $Value Tons I km Consumed Carbon 
Employed Added Produced Transported (w/o Feedstocks) Emissions" 
(x 106) (X 109) (x 106) (x 10 12) (GW/ yr/s) (x 106) 
Market 130 4632 1095 6 1164 766 
economies 
Reforming 80 975 515 8 851 584 
economies 
Developing 300 1068 895 8 1116 733 
economies 
World 510 6675 2505 22 3131 2083 
1 In decreasing order of global tonnage: cement, steel, paper, fertilizer, gl ass, aluminum. copper. 
2 Including manufacture of cement. Carbon emissions from electricity production allocated to 
industry in proportion of industrial to total electricity consumption. 
Data sources: Economist, 1990; ILO, 1991; !RF. 1991; U.N. , 1990. 
growth in Colin Clark's (1940) classic Conditions of Economic Progress. Data 
indicate at least a factor of 200 improvement since the middle of the 18th century. 
Thus, an industrial worker in the United States produces today in one hour what 
took a U .K. laborer two weeks of toiling 12-hour days some 200 years ago. 
The growth in labor productivity illustrates the crucial role of technological and 
organizational change. Other factors important for industrialization include the 
availability of (skilled) labor, capital, energy and mineral resources , and to a lesser 
extent land and the productivity of the agricultural sector. The absolute and rela-
tive availability of factor inputs (e.g., the relative scarcity of labor vs . capital) 
influence historical industrialization paths and can also account for present differ-
ences in industry size, structure, and productivity among countries. In turn, tech-
nological change influences both the absolute and the relative availability of factor 
inputs to industry. 
In highlighting technological , social , and organizational innovations as drivers of 
industrial growth, we seem to question the role of natural resource endowments. ls 
the availability of energy and mineral resources not a conditio sine qua non for 
industrialization? The author is inclined to consider resource availability as of sec-
ondary importance, especially for the industrial system, based on the spatial division 
of primary (raw materials) and secondary (manufacturing) activities that emerged 
with the availability of modern transportation systems since the 19th century. First, 
without technology no natural resource can be harvested and processed for input to 
industrial activities. Second, the availability of resources is itself a function of tech-
nology (via, e.g., geological knowledge, exploration and production technologies). 
Thirdly, technology development can provide for substitutes such as the replacement 
of natural nitrate by manmade fertilizers, or natural by synthetic rubber. 
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From this perspective, different degrees of development and industrialization 
are technology gaps resulting from differences in accumulation and innovative-
ness, and not so much from resource endowments or scarcity. Innovative capacity 
(and thus production, income and growth possibilities) is created (among others 
by human capital and an appropriate socio-institutional framework), and not 
given. Historical analysis indicates a number of cases where successful industrial-
ization was achieved even with only modest national natural resource endowments 
(e.g., France, Scandinavia, Austria, Japan). Considering the resource and environ-
mental intensiveness of different industrialization paths (discussed below), the 
abundance of resources even could be a mixed blessing. One might wonder if 
coal-rich China will develop along the energy-intensive development path of the 
United States, or alternatively along more energy-efficient pathways of industrial-
ization as in the French or Japanese experience. 
The Spread of Industrialization: Technology Clusters, Sources of 
Growth, and Spatial Heterogeneity 
Below we illustrate that industrialization, embedded within a broader framework 
of economic growth, proceeded through a succession of development periods 
based on the pervasive adoption of various "technology clusters," i.e., a set of 
(interrelated) technological, organizational and institutional innovations driving 
industrial output and productivity growth. Such a succession is, however, not a 
rigid temporal sequence as various clusters coexist (with changing weights) at any 
given time. Older technological and infrastructural combinations coexist with the 
dominant technology cluster, and in some cases previous clusters (compared to the 
dominant technology base in the leading industrialized countries) are perpetuated, 
as was largely the case in the post-World War II industrial policy of the former 
USSR. 
At any time most industrial and economic growth is, however, driven by the 
dominant technology cluster, frequently associated with the most visible techno-
logical artifact or infrastructural system (or "leading sector") of the time (e.g., the 
"railways era'· [Schumpeter, 1939] or the "age of steel and electricity" [Freeman, 
1989]). We emphasize the concept of technology clusters because studies under 
the leading sector hypothesis (e.g., Fishlow, 1965; O'Brien, 1983; Tunzelmann, 
1982) have shown that these can explain only a fraction of economic and indus-
trial growth. Only the combination of a whole host of innovations in many sectors 
and technological fields can account for sustained industrial and economic growth. 
Table 2 is an attempt to categorize various phases of industrial and economic 
development through the concept of technology clusters. It lists the dominant clus-
ter in the top row and the emerging cluster (dominating in the successive phase) 
below. Examples of key technologies in the areas of energy and transport systems, 
materials and industry, and the final consumer sphere are listed. Finally, we cate-
gorize the dominant "organizational style" (Perez, 1983), i.e., the predominant 
mode regulating industrial, economic, and social relations, and give a geographical 
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Table 2: Important technology clusters for economic growth and industrialization 
17 50--1820: 1800--1870: 1850--1940: 1920--2000: Mass 1980--
Cluster Textile Steam Heavy Engineering Production/Consumption Total Quality 
Dominant 
Energy Water, wind, feed, wood Wood, feed, coal Coal Oil, electricity Gas, electricity 
Transport and Turnpikes Canals Railways, steamships, Roads, telephone, Roads, air transport, 
communication telegraph radio, and TV multimedia 
communications 
Materials I run Iron, puddling steel Steel Petrochemicals, plastics, Alloys, specialty materials 
steel, aluminum 
Industry Castings Stationary steam, Heavy machinery, Process plants, Environmental 
mechanization chemicals, structural numerically-controlled technologies, disassembly 
.j:>. 
00 materials machinery, consumer and recycling, consumer 
goods, drugs services 
Consumer products Textiles (wool, cotton), Textiles, chinaware Product diversification Durables, food industry, Leisure and vacation, 
pottery (imports) tourism custom-made products 
Emerging 
Energy Coal, coke City gas Oil, electricity Gas, nuclear Hydrogen? 
Transport and Canals Mobile steam, Roads and cars, Air transport. Hypersonic? high-speed 
communication telegraph telephone, radio telecommunication, trains 
computers 
Materials Puddling steel Mass produced steel Synthetics, aluminum "Custom-made" Recyclables and 
materials , composites degradables 
Industry Stationary steam, Coal chemicals, dyes, Fine chemicals, drugs, Electronics, information Services (software), 
mechanical equipment structural materials durables technologies biotechnologies 
Consumer products China ware Illuminants Consumer durables, Leisure and recreation Integrated "packages" 
refrigeration products, arts (products + services) 
~ 
'° 
Organizational Style 
Plant/company levei Individual 
entrepreneurs, local 
capital, small-scale 
manufacture 
Economy and society Breakdown of feudal 
and medieval economic 
structures 
Industrial Geography 
Core England 
Rim Belgium, France 
1 JANZ= Japan, Australia, New Zealand 
Small firms, joint 
stock companies 
"Laissez-faire," 
Manchester liberalism 
England, Belgium 
France, Germany, USA 
"Giants," cartels, trusts, Fordismffaylorism, 
pervasive multinationals, vertical 
standardization integration 
Imperialism, colonies, Social welfare state, 
monopoly and Keynsianism, "open" 
oligopoly regulation, society 
unionization 
Germany, USA, USA, Canada, JANZ, 
Benelux. France, European Community, 
England England 
Central Europe, Italy, USSR, Central and 
Scandinavia, Canada, Eastern Europe, 
JANZ1, Russia Southern Europe 
2 4 Tigers describes the dynamic rapidly industrializing economies of Asia: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
"Just-in-time," Total 
quality control (TQC), 
horizontal integration 
Economic deregulation, 
environmental regulation, 
networks of actors 
OECD 
4 Tigers,2 Russia, Central 
and Eastern Europe, ?? 
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taxonomy 1 of centers of industrialization ("core") and regions catching up (newly 
industrializing or "rim" countries). All regions/countries not listed separately in 
Table 2 are classified as "industrial periphery" for the purposes of this discussion. 
Four historical and a prospective fifth future cluster are identified, named after 
their most important carrier branches or functioning principles. These are: the tex-
tile industrialization cluster, extending to the 1820s; the steam cluster until about 
the 1870s; heavy engineering, lasting until the eve of World War II; and mass pro-
duction/consumption until the 1970s and 1980s. Currently we appear in the transi-
tion to a new age of industrialization. Both its characterization as a "total quality" 
cluster (i.e., with control of both the internal and external, or environmental, qual-
ity of industrial production) and the technological examples given are necessarily 
speculative. 
It has to be emphasized that the classification presented in Table 2 is a crude one 
and the examples are illustrative, not exhaustive. Also the timing of the various 
clusters in Table 2 is only approximate. In view of space limitations, the following 
qualitative2 discussion of Table 2 will be brief and (over)simplified. 
1750-1820: Textiles 
Industrialization as a process of structural change began in I 8th-century England. 
Technological innovations transformed the manufacture of textiles and gave rise to 
what later became a new mode of production: the factory system. Important bottle-
necks for industrialization and its concomitant spatial concentration of population 
and economic activities began to be overcome. Coal and Darby's coke combined 
with the stationary steam engine (particularly important for coal mine dewatering) 
put an end to fuelwood and charcoal shortages and provided for spatial power densi-
ties previously found only in exceptional locations of abundant hydropower. The 
improvements in parish roads and turnpikes and especially the "canal mania" around 
the tum of the 19th century enabled the supply of rapidly rising urban and industrial 
centers with food, energy, and raw materials. Charcoal and the puddling furnace pro-
duced the first industrial commodity and structural material: wrought iron. 
Innovations in spinning (and after the 1820s also in weaving) enabled falling costs 
and rising output, particularly in the manufacture of cotton textiles. The introduction 
of fine porcelain from China gave rise to an expanding chinaware industry. 
1 This taxonomy is introduced to account for persistent spatial disparities in leve ls of industriali zation, technol -
ogy base , and degree of interconnectedness (exchange of information and goods) between countries/regions. 
Note that this is a functional categorization and not necessarily one based on geographical proximity. For similar 
concepts discussed within the framework of sustainability, see Brooks, 1988. 
2 For a quantification using principal component analysi s see Glaziev , 1991; for an analysis based on innovation 
diffusion cf. Grtibler ( 1990). The rise (and fall) of particular "technology clusters" has also been described using 
particular sec tors or representative technologies (e.g., energy and transport infrastructures) as "'metaphors." In 
view of abundant literature (e.g., Hoffmann, 1931 , 1958; Woytinsky and Woytinsky, 1953: Landes. 1969; 
Rostow, 1978; Mok yr. 1990) containing valuable historical data and easily available output statistics of principal 
industrial commodities (e.g .. Mitchell , 1980, 1982, 1983), this infomiation is not further discussed here. 
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The nexus of innovations involving cotton textiles, the coal and iron industries, 
and the introduction of steam power constitute the heart of England's Industrial 
Revolution. However, in order for these developments to take place, important pre-
conditions must be mentioned. More complex crop rotation patterns, abandonment 
of fallow lands, field enclosures, new crops, and improved animal husbandry 
allowed fewer people to grow more food (cf. Grigg, 1987; Grtibler, 1992). Freed 
from agriculture, people sought urban residence and industrial employment. In the 
institutional sphere, the separation of political and economic power, new institutions 
for scientific research and dissemination of its results, organization of market rela-
tions, etc., all mark the breakdown of feudal and medieval economic structures with 
their associated monopolies, guilds, tolls, and restrictions on trade. Perhaps the intel-
lectual and institutional/organizational changes were indeed the most fundamental 
(Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986) as enabling and encouraging changes in the fields of 
industrial technology, products, markets, infrastructures, etc. Under a general laissez 
faire attitude, no provision was made to socially smooth the disruptive process of 
structural change in employment, rural-urban residence, value generation, and dis-
tribution of income, leading to violent manifestations of social and class conflict 
(e.g., Luddists, or the Captain Swing movement; cf. Hobsbawn and Rude, 1968). 
1820-1870: Steam 
In this period, lasting to the recession in the 1870s, industrialization emerges from 
a spatially and sectorally confined phenomenon to a pervasive principle of eco-
nomic organization. Industrialization continues to be dominated by England, 
which reaches its apogee as the world's leading industrial power by the 1870s, 
accounting for nearly one-quarter of the global industrial output. Industrialization 
spreads to the continent (Belgium, and the Lorraine and the Ruhr in France and 
Germany, respectively) and to the eastern United States much along the lines of 
the successful English model (textiles, coal and iron industry). 
Coal (fuelwood in the United States) provides the principal energy form for 
industry, whereas transportation and household energy needs continue to be sup-
plied mostly by renewable energy sources (animal feed and wood). The steam 
period is characterized by the emergence of mobile steam power (locomotives and 
boats), but transport infrastructures are still dominated by inland navigation and 
canals, reaching their maximum network size by the 1870s (in England, France 
and the United States). Important innovations emerge in the fields of materials 
(Bessemer steel production), transport and communications (railways and 
telegraphs), energy (city gas), and the (coal-based) chemical industry. These were 
to become the dominant technological cluster of the second half of the 19th cen-
tury until the Great Depression of the 1930s. 
1870-1930: Heavy Engineering 
Fueled by coal, this industrialization phase is dominated by railways, steam, and 
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steel: it is the most smokestack-intensive period of industrialization. Dominated 
by the output of primary commodities and capital equipment, the industrial infra-
structure spreads on a global scale. Enlarging the industrial and infrastructural 
base becomes almost a self-fulfilling purpose, driven by economies of scale at all 
levels of industrial production and organization. Standardization of mass-pro-
duced components and structural materials, perhaps best symbolized by the Eiffel 
Tower, is another characteristic of heavy engineering. 
England loses its position as industrial leader (in terms of production and inno-
vations) to Germany and the United States. The latter emerges as the world's 
largest industrial power by the 1920s, accounting for 40% of global manufacturing 
output (Bairoch, 1982), 60% of world steel production (Grtibler, 1987), and 80% 
of cars registered worldwide (MVMA, 1991 ). 
Railway networks and ocean steamships draw distant continents into the vortex of 
international trade, dominated by the industrialized core countries. Free world trade, 
greatly facilitated by the universal adoption of the Gold Standard, grows exponen-
tially, but its political counterparts are imperialism and colonialism. Trade flows are 
dominated by trade between the industrialized core countries (see Table 2) and the 
rapidly industrializing rim (Russia and Japan). The industrial periphery (regions 
with the weakest industrial base) provides ever-enlarging markets for the products of 
the industrialized core and supplies raw materials and food (long-distance trade 
being made possible after the invention of canned food and refrigeration). 
The pace of technological change accelerates with the emergence of oil, petro-
chemicals, synthetics, radio, telephone, and, above all, electricity, but the institu-
tional and regulative picture is less progressive. Emerging industrial giants, 
monopolies, and oligopolies, perhaps best symbolized by Rockefeller's Standard 
Oil Company, are at the focus of government regulatory efforts, while social 
issues are only beginning to be tackled. Legislation to limit child labor, provide for 
elementary health care, and reduce long working days (up to 16 hours per day) is 
introduced at a slow pace and implemented at an even slower one. Dissatisfaction 
with the prevailing capitalistic accumulation regime stimulates the development 
of alternative theoretical expositions (Marxism) and the emergence of new social 
movements (the labor movement, trade unionization), aiming at a more equitable 
distribution of productivity gains. Workers reap some of the benefits in the form of 
increasing employment, falling real-term prices of food and manufactured prod-
ucts, and (to a smaller extent) rising wages. But the inability of the social/institu-
tional framework to provide for a more equitable distribution of productivity gains 
causes increased social conflicts. These begin to be resolved only by progressively 
internalizing labor costs into the economics of industrial growth, as symbolized by 
the social welfare state emerging in the 1920s. 
1930-1980: Mass Production/Consumption 
The post-World War II economic boom was based on a cluster of interrelated tech-
nical and managerial innovations, leading to productivity levels clearly superior to 
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those of the heavy engineering paradigm. The extension of the continuous flow 
concept of the chemical industry to the mass production of identical units enabled 
unprecedented real-term cost and price decreases and thus mass consumption. 
Typical products include the internal combustion engine and the automobile, 
petrochemicals and plastics, farm machinery and fertilizers , consumer durables, 
etc. The prototype of the associated production organization was the Fordist 
assembly line, complemented on the organizational level by a separation of man-
agement and administration from production along the ideas of Taylor's scientific 
management. Additional economies of scale were realized by the increasing verti-
cal integration of industrial activities and the emergence of enterprises operating 
on a global scale (multinationals). 
New energy, transport, and communication infrastructures proved vital. 
Petroleum was available at low (real-term) costs and became the principle energy 
carrier and feedstock. Roads and vehicles powered by internal combustion engines 
(cars in market economies and buses in formerly planned and in developing 
economies) replaced railways as dominant transport systems. Air transportation 
and global communication networks (telephone, radio, and TV) have not only 
reduced physical distances but also enhanced cultural and informational inter-
changes. Science has grown "big" (de Solla-Price, 1963) and has been integrated 
systematically into industrial activities, from industrial R&D laboratories to prod-
uct quality control and even consumer research. 
Although industrialization has become a global phenomenon, an analysis 
reveals only a few examples of successful catching up (notably Japan). Instead, 
catching up happens more within given geographical regions or between regions 
with not too different degrees of industrial development. In terms of the spatial 
taxonomy adopted here, this implies that some former members of the industrial 
rim (Canada, Japan, Scandinavia, Austria, Switzerland, Italy) have joined the core, 
but the dominance of the core is as great as ever. The members of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries account for 70% 
of the world's industrial output and for 75% of the world merchandise trade 
(World Bank, 1992). Over 80% of OECD' s imports of manufactured goods is 
imported from other OECD members, another 9% from the industrial rim (Eastern 
Europe and 4-Tigers ), and only about I 0% from the rest of the world (World Bank, 
1992). 
Examples of the social-institutional framework associated with the mass 
production/consumption regime include Keynsian policies leading to various 
forms of demand management (enabling mass consumption) via public infrastruc-
ture, defense, and public service spending, and via income redistribution (the 
welfare state). Other examples include socio-institutional innovations such as 
large-scale consumer credits, publicity, development of mass communication, 
institutional embedding of labor unions, or the development of various forms of 
Sozialpartnerschaft as the institutional framework of a social consensus on the 
general growth trajectory. However, it appears that we are witnessing a widening 
mismatch (Perez, 1983) between this socio-institutional framework and the 
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attainment of (market, environmental, and social acceptance) limits to the further 
expansion of its production/consumption paradigm. 
Industrialization: Output and Productivity Growth 
Estimates of global industrial output growth (Rostow, 1978; Bairoch, 1982; 
Haustein and Neuwirth's 1982 update of Hoffmann, 1958) indicate a growth over 
the last 100 years of some 3.5% annually. Although estimates differ on global 
industrial growth during the early industrialization phase, they agree on an expo-
nential growth pattern since the latter half of the 19th century. This, however, 
applies only to estimates of the monetary value of industrial output and not to its 
physical equivalent. The material intensiveness of industrial output varies over 
time and, especially in the OECD countries, has been declining for decades (cf. 
Williams et al., 1987). 
Table 3 summarizes the geographical distribution of industrial output growth, 
following the spatial taxonomy adopted here. Based on Bairoch 's estimate, the 
industrial output of England in 1900 is used as normalizing index. Thus, Table 3 
indicates that the industrial output of England in 1900 approximated that of the 
entire globe 150 years earlier. Conversely, global industrial output in 1980 was a 
factor over 100 larger than in England 80 years earlier. Since the mid-19th century, 
the industrialized core countries account persistently for up to two-thirds of 
global industrial output. Table 3 indicates that the industrial core has persistently 
higher growth rates than the rim and periphery. Only in 1930-80 does the rim 
show higher growth rates than the core, i.e. , it is catching up. But the absolute and 
relative gap between the industrial core and the periphery widens. It is beyond 
the scope of this chapter to discuss reasons (or possible remedies) for persistent, 
even widening, disparities in levels of industrial development. One frequent 
argument points to falling real-term primary resource prices and resulting deterio-
rating terms of trade. However, one has also to keep in mind the constant 
change in the industrial structure of the core, and especially its falling materials 
intensity. Thus, deteriorating terms of trade can partly explain why industrial 
growth rates in the periphery were smaller than to be expected from their factor 
endowments. However, they are an insufficient explanation for the persistently 
higher growth rates in the core. Instead, the success of the core appears more 
related to its dynamics of industrial innovation and the resulting rise in factor 
productivity. 
Figure 3 presents estimates of the improvement in labor productivity in manu-
facturing for a number of industrialized countries. The international comparison of 
industrial and manufacturing labor productivity is far from easy. Differences in 
industrial output mix, relative price structure, exchange rates, labor qualification, 
industrial relations, hours worked, etc., still await definitive methodological and 
empirical resolutions. Therefore, the data primarily illustrate the evolution of labor 
productivity over time within a given country, rather than serving as a yardstick 
for international comparisons. 
54 
A. Griibler: Industrialization as a Historical Phenomenon 
Table 3: The global geography of industrialization (level of industrialization in the 
UK. in 1900 = 100) 
1980 
-
1750 1830s 1870s 1920s 1980 1750 
Level in: 
Core 2 20 180 950 7400 3080 
Rim 5 20 40 190 2300 430 
Periphery 120 145 100 220 1300 II 
World 127 185 320 1360 11000 87 
Growth rates , %/yr: 
Core 2.6 4.6 3.6 4.0 3.6 
Rim 1.7 1.3 3.3 5.0 2.7 
Periphery 0.2 -0.7 1.7 3.5 I. I 
World 0.5 I. I 3.1 4.1 2.0 
Regional shares. %: 
Core 2 10 56 70 67 
Rim 4 II 12 14 21 
Periphery 94 79 31 16 12 
All figures rounded. Regional shares and factor increases calculated from original data may differ 
from rounded figures. 
Data source: Bairoch. 1982. 
Persistent differences in levels of labor productivity in manufacturing among 
the industrialized countries (not to mention the developing ones) emerge from 
Figure 3. Apparently, distinct national industrial systems (in terms of sectoral 
structure, technology base, etc.) with associated institutional settings (working 
time regulation, wage negotiation, etc.) have evolved. The cumulativeness of such 
industrialization paths is responsible for persistent differences in productivity 
despite intense international trade and competition. Some of the historical differ-
ences can also be related to the relative availability of various factor inputs. For 
example, labor was comparatively scarce for U.S. industry. Consequently, com-
pared to that of England, U.S. industrial labor productivity was already higher 
when the U.S. was still a newly industrializing country. 
Industrialization and Environment 
The environmental implications of industrialization can perhaps best be described 
by Gray's (1989) paradox of technological development. Industrialization has 
brought unprecedented levels of environmental impacts stemming from effluents 
whose impacts are fairly well understood. It has also introduced new materials and 
substances (e.g., chlorofluorocarbons) with hitherto unknown impacts on the envi-
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Comparative productivity levels are only approximate; therefore weight should be given only to the 
relative evolution of productivity in a given country over time. Industrial labor productivity gains 
have been extraordinary and have allowed rising incomes (wages) and shortening of working hours. 
Industrial output and employment data are from Liesner. 1985. and Mitchell. 1980, 1983; working 
hours from Maddison, 1991. Productivity figures between 1840 and 1930 have been harmonized 
with the estimates of Clark, 1940. 
ronment. But at the same time, the technological change that goes along with 
industrialization and the growing incomes generated by rising productivity have 
also enhanced our technological and economic capacities for remedies. 
Industry has built in an inherent incentive structure to minimize factor inputs. 
This is primarily driven by economics and by continuous technological change. 
Therefore, industry moves in the right direction, and the real issue is how to 
accelerate this desirable trend. "The right direction" means, in principle, two 
things: ( 1) minimizing resource inputs per unit of economic activity, i.e ., demate· 
r-ialization, and (2) improving the environmental compatibility of the materials 
Jsed, processed, and delivered by industry, i.e., with respect to industrial 
!nergy use, decarbonization. Energy-related carbon emissions are the largest 
~lobal expression of industry's metabolism, hence they are used as an illustration 
:>elow. 
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Toward Industrial Dematerialization and Decarbonization 
An analysis of industrial energy intensity per unit value added over time shows 
two important trends: decreasing energy intensities in the industrialized countries, 
and increasing intensities in newly industrializing ones. The much higher energy 
input per unit value added in the latter is frequently interpreted as potential for 
short- to medium-term energy efficiency improvements. However, higher energy 
intensities are in most cases the result of differences in degrees of industrialization 
and resulting differences in the structure and technology base of industry. This is 
illustrated in Figure 4, where the industrial energy intensity per unit value added is 
plotted against per capita levels of industrial value added. From such a perspec-
tive, the energy intensity of the Brazilian industry is in fact quite similar to that of 
the Japanese at similar levels of industrial per capita output. Conversely, the 
Nigerian example gives rise to concerns: increasing intensities of factor input use, 
but no significant growth in per capita levels of industrial output. The most spec-
tacular improvements in industrial energy intensity were achieved in South Korea, 
illustrating that rapid industrial development and vigorous efficiency improve-
ments are not mutually exclusive. Again, we observe only conditional conver-
gence between countries and persistent differences between intensity "trajecto-
ries" of industrial development (e.g., United States vs. Japan). 
The existence of specific industrialization trajectories illustrated above is also 
consistent with comparative macroeconomic studies of industrial development. 
Chenery et al. ( 1986) developed a typology of industrialization paths based on a 
differentiation of three classes of variables: size of the economy (small vs. large), 
sector orientation (primary vs. manufacturing), and trade orientation (inward vs. 
outward orientation). Over the post-World War II period, the highest industrial 
growth rates in semi-industrialized countries were achieved in small, manufactur-
ing, and outward-oriented economies. Convergence is confined to countries 
belonging to a particular typological group rather than existing between groups. 
Chenery's typology constitutes an important differentiation of Rostow's (1978) 
stage theory of economic development. Instead of a single linear development 
model, a number of distinct development trajectories exist. Success appears also to 
be contingent on developing at least part of the industrial base on the technological 
productivity frontier. Perhaps the former USSR, or China's experience with rapid 
industrialization during the Great Leap Forward, can provide lessons on the feasi-
bility of industrialization based on outdated technological vintages and industrial 
structures. 
Figure S illustrates industrial carbon emissions as an environmental indicator of 
industrialization. An analog to Figure 4, it shows the industrial carbon intensity vs . 
per capita levels of industrialization. Carbon emissions from electricity generation 
are attributed to industry in proportion to industry's share in total electricity con-
sumption and based on the (changing) average fuel mix in electricity generation. 
Overall, the decreasing carbon intensity of industrial activities is dominated by 
improvements in energy efficiency (cf. Figure 4). 
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assess the evolution of industrial energy intensity. Data from: Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory (LBL) 
data base and IEA, 199 l. 
Another factor explaining differences in industrial carbon intensity and its 
changes over time are changes in the structure of the industrial output. For 
instance, about 50% (some 230 million tons C) of U.S. industrial carbon emissions 
result from products contributing only to 15% (some $200 billion) of the industrial 
value added, whereas 50% ($780 billion) of the industrial value added is produced 
with only 13% (60 million tons C) of the sector ' s carbon emissions (Marland and 
Pippin, 1990). The skewed distribution function of industrial carbon emissions 
(Figure 6) indicates the importance of changes in the output mix, albeit these are 
difficult to model, yet to predict. 
A Case Study of Carbon Emissions in the U.S. Steel Industry 
This section uses the U.S. steel industry to illustrate the importance of structural 
shifts in process technologies and energy supply mix in moving in the direction of 
industrial dematerialization and decarbonization. Figure 7 illustrates specific and 
total sector carbon emissions since the middle of the second half of the I 9th 
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industrialization ( 1000 U.S. $ 1980 per capita), cf. Figure 4 above. Data source: energy and value 
added: LBL data base, carbon emissions: emission factors based on Ausubel et al., 1988; electricity 
production structure from !EA, 1991. 
century. Although minimizing carbon emissions has not yet been on the agenda 
of the industry, it is interesting to note the significant improvement (factor of 20) 
in the carbon emissions per ton (pig iron) produced. The secular trend follows a 
typical industrial learning curve when plotted against the cumulative output as 
done in Figure 7. Thus, specific carbon emissions decrease by 17% for each 
doubling of cumulative output. As significant as these improvements have 
been, their rate has fallen short of output growth. Consequently, total sector emis-
sions (including emissions from the generation of the electricity consumed by 
industry) have increased over time, but apparently have already passed through 
their historical maximum. However, the important point here is to compare 
actual emissions with what they would have been if growth had been achieved 
by simply intensifying existing production methods. (In reality, the tremendous 
output increases could only be sustained precisely because of technological 
change.) The historical role of technology change has been, therefore, two-
fold: first, enabling significant output growth (and emissions) and, second, at 
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the same time averting even worse impacts, due to significant efficiency 
improvements. 
Improvements in the carbon intensity of steel manufacture were achieved by a 
combination of gradual, incremental, and radical changes in both process tech-
nology (Figure 8) and the energy supply mix (Figure 9). These two sets of changes 
operating in tandem are yet another illustration of the importance of interlinkages 
among different technological systems. Changes in the fuel mix are closely tied 
to changes in industrial process technologies and both are instrumental for achiev-
ing energy efficiency improvements. They also point to the holistic nature of 
measures needed to accelerate desirable rates of industrial dematerialization and 
decarbonization. 
Impacts of Industrialization on Consumption and Leisure 
Industrialization had and continues to have far-reaching social impacts. Changes in 
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employment structure, urbanization, increased life expectancy, rising incomes, and 
reductions in working time are examples of social changes directly and indirectly 
resulting from industrial output and productivity growth. Contingent on a social 
consensus, productivity gains have been distributed among rising wages and 
incomes (cf. Phelps Brown, 1973) and reductions of working time (Figure 10). 
Perhaps the changes in time allocation patterns are among the least known of 
the social impacts of industrialization. Some 100 years ago, a U.K. laborer had an 
average life expectancy at the age of 10 of about 48 years and at age 20 of about 40 
years, i.e., a total life span of less than 60 years. Before education became manda-
tory, labor began young, and essentially men who were healthy enough worked 
until they died (average length of a work career: about 47 years). Over his lifetime 
a male worker worked about 150,000 hours, or 60% of his available lifetime after 
subtracting necessary "physiological" time (i.e., the time required to eat and 
sleep). Today a typical male worker in the U.K. works some 88,000 hours during 
his lifetime. Due to reduced working time and increased life expectancy he spends 
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only about 25% of his available lifetime at the work place. Trends in working timE 
reductions (at paid work) for women have been less pronounced, but nevertheles~ 
noteworthy (cf. Ausubel and GrUbler, 1990). International and intertemporal time-
budget studies report on a broadly converging change in the structure of time allo-
cation of the population (Figure 11 ). 
More free time, coupled with higher incomes, has led to the development of 
lifestyles centered around private consumption and demand for services (cf. 
Gershuny, 1983). The structure of employment, industry, and production has 
followed suit. It is important to note to what extent resource consumption in post-
industrial societies has become dominated by private consumption and leisure activ-
ities. Schipper et al. (1989) present data on final energy consumption for the FRG, 
indicating a dramatic shift in the relative share of energy consumption between pro-
ductive (i.e., industrial) and consumptive (i.e., services and private households) uses 
of energy. Industry accounted in 1950 for two-thirds of final energy consumption, 
whereas today it accounts for only one-third. In future, it will become increasingly 
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important for industry to take up the challenge to assist consumers in more environ-
mentally compatible lifestyle choices-in providing not only new ("green") prod-
ucts, but also ways to ensure that environmentally friendly products are adopted, 
used and dispensed appropriately. All this implies redefining traditional markets for 
industrial products and services in the direction of integrated packages, focusing on 
the delivery of end-use services rather than on artifacts. 
Conclusion 
Industrialization as a historical phenomenon is conceptualized as a succession 
of phases, characterized by the pervasive adoption of "technology clusters." The 
introduction of a host of technological, institutional, and organizational innovations 
leads to productivity gains, impossible by a mere intensification of traditional solu-
tions. From this perspective, industrialization is a time-specific phenomenon, 
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characterized by (discontinuous) processes of change in the areas of economic struc-
ture, technological base, and social relations. History matters because of the cumula-
tiveness of socio-institutional and technological change. This results in distinct 
development trajectories, spanning the extremes of high-intensity and high-
efficiency industrialization paths, clearly discernible from historical data. 
With respect to environmental impacts, minimizing factor inputs is an inherent 
part of the incentive structure of industry. Improved factor productivity and lowered 
resource intensiveness of industrial production have historically accompanied 
structural changes in industry. In principle, industry is moving in the right direc-
tion, referred to here as dematerialization and decarbonization. This gives reasons 
to be cautiously optimistic, albeit historical trends will have to be accelerated sig-
nificantly to reduce the absolute levels of emissions and environmental impacts. 
As in the past, changes in technology, energy, and transport infrastructures, and in 
social and institutional regulatory mechanisms, will be instrumental. 
If environmental compatibility indeed could become a new dominant paradigm 
of industrial development, future sources of industrial growth will be primarily in 
this area. Such tendencies will be first discernible in the most advanced postindus-
trial economies (i.e., in the industrial core). It is our contention that (as in the past) 
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successful catching up will only be possible if based on technological and institu-
tional solutions not in conflict with the dominant industrial paradigm of the core. 
Industrialization has brought tremendous productivity gains and resulting rising 
incomes and reduced working time-in short, affluence and leisure. From an envi-
ronmental perspective activities outside the productive sphere are increasingly the 
determinants of resource consumption and environmental impacts. Furthermore, 
private and leisure activities are more difficult to steer with traditional policy 
instruments, such as price signals to which industry adheres. The decision-making 
criteria of consumers are complex and far from the rationality concepts underlying 
most economic models. Perhaps this will provide the largest future challenge to 
industry: providing consumers not with products, but with environmentally 
friendly integrated solutions to satisfy a particular service demand. 
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